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Abstract
This paper considers committees of n players that vote by
(weighted) majority on policies that are binding for all members.
The voting mechanism is implemented before the players learn
their preferred policies. I derive a formula that measures ex-ante
welfare and utility of such a committee as a function of the vote
allocation. It will be shown that the simple one-player-one-vote
rule is welfare maximizing if every player has the same weight
in the social welfare function. For the case of difierent welfare
weights numerical examples show that it might be optimal to in-
clude player with zero welfare weights in a committee.
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1 Introduction
Most decisions on policy issues are made by voting within committees,
e.g. parliaments or councils of supranational or national institutions (as
the EU council or central bank councils). The members of a commit-
tee represent usually some constituencies which consist of agents with
heterogenous preferences. Hence the committee members will have di-
verging interests as well. Moreover, the preferences are normally only
private information. The chosen policies, however, are in general binding
for everyone. Under these constraints, the design of a committee involves
two important problems. The flrst one is a problem of representation:
How should the members of a committee be elected. The second one,
which will be the focus of this paper, is the problem of mechanism design
within a committee: Under which rules should decisions be made? This
paper provides a welfare analysis of difierent voting mechanisms available
for committees. Moreover, it derives conditions for the optimal design of
a committee.
In this paper I introduce a framework that uses an abstract formula-
tion of preferred policies which still delivers an explicit and simple welfare
analysis of voting in committees. Preferred policies are modelled as ran-
dom variables and the utility derived from a common policy is modelled
assuming a quadratic loss function. Modelling preferred policies as ran-
dom variables is a fruitful approach especially for an analysis focussing
on the constitutional stage in which the committee is introduced. There
a certain voting rule is implemented behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. be-
fore the preferences are known. Moreover, it is an appropriate technique
to study committees that vote every period over one policy and where
the interests of the difierent players are determined (or at least strongly
in°uenced) by exogenous stochastic variables. An important example
is the determination of monetary policy as in the Council of the future
European Central Bank [see Brueckner (1997)]. The tool for comparing
difierent committees in this framework is the expected value of an ad-
ditive social welfare function (SWF). I compare the results with other
simple non-voting mechanisms and with the outcome of a joint optimal
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decision. The latter is shown to be unfeasible in this model.
The main advantage of the approach adopted in this paper is that
it directly measures expected utility of the players and social welfare as
a function of the voting mechanism. Hence difierent mechanisms can
easily be ranked according to their welfare efiects. Since the assumptions
needed for the results are fairly standard in economic analysis, this ap-
proach can be seen as an improvement on standard methods even if it is
more limited in its scope. The most common traditional analytical tools
for an analysis of voting in committees are power indices (PI)1, spatial
voting models2 and, more general, the theory of voting as part of the
social choice literature3. One main drawback of PI is that they measure
the in°uence on decisions and not the utility derived from the decisions.
Hence they are especially insu–cient for a welfare analysis when there
is voting over common policies. Spatial voting models analyze decisions
when preferences of the players are given and are hence not suitable if
one is interested in committees that work in a stochastic environment.
Moreover, as in social choice theory in general the focus is more on the
equilibrium decisions and less on their welfare efiects, which is partly
due to the fact that this literature works primarily only with ordinal
preference relations.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the
general model of the preferences. For this environment the joint optimal
decision is characterized and it is illustrated why this decision is not
feasible. Two simple decision mechanisms (dictator mechanism and a
flxed policy mechanism) are presented as benchmark cases. In section 3
a speciflc voting mechanism is introduced. Due to the restriction on the
domain of preferences in this paper, this mechanism leads to the standard
median voter result for equilibrium policies. In section 4 I analyze how
expected social welfare depends on the vote allocation in the committee.
I develop a formula for the general case where the voting weights can
be difierent across players. Moreover, I illustrate as well why PI are
1See Stra±n (1995) for a survey.
2See e.g. Enelow and Hinich (1984)
3See especially Miller (1995) and Moulin (1995).
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insu–cient for a welfare analysis of this type. Section 5 characterizes the
welfare maximizing vote allocation for difierent SWF. I will show that if
every player has the same weight in the SWF, the vote allocation that
maximizes expected welfare is one where every player has one vote. In
the sequel I provide a complete analysis for small committees (up to 5
members) and an example for a large voting body. Hereby I illustrate
how an optimal vote allocation can be derived as well in the case where
the players have difierent weights in the SWF. By example I show that
it might be welfare improving to include players in the committee who
have no weight in the SWF. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The committee consists of n-players that decide jointly on a one-dimensional
policy x 2 X ‰ <. This policy is binding for every player. The deci-
sion of forming the committee is taken as exogenously given. Hence it is
implicitly assumed that the beneflts of deciding jointly on a policy are
(ex-ante) higher compared to the case of separate decisions.
The preferences of the members i 2 N over this policy are assumed
to be independently uniformly distributed random variables. Formally,
they are given by
xi » U [0; 1] 8i (A1)
E (xi xj) = E (xi)E (xj) 8j 6= i;
This assumption implies that all members are ex-ante identical with re-
spect to their preferred policies. Moreover it says that the preferences
are independent across players. The assumption of uniformity eases the
analysis considerably. The restriction of the distribution on the interval
[0; 1] is, however, without any loss of generality. In general the approach
in this paper can be extended to other distribution functions, that might
even difier between players and be correlated. The advantage of the cho-
sen form is that it highlights the main welfare mechanisms of the voting
procedure and gives clear cut, easily understandable solutions.
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The time structure of the model is as follows. In period 0 the
distribution of the preferences of all players are common knowledge. The
decision mechanism is implemented in this period 0. In the following
period every player learns his own preference xi, which is assumed to be
private information. The players can communicate with each other, but
there is no mechanism that can enforce any kind of sidepayments. Then
the committee decides according to the chosen mechanism on the policy
x:
The ex-post utility of a player i 2 N is given by
Ui = ¡ (xi ¡ x)
2 (A2)
This is a standard quadratic loss function, the utility loss increases more
than proportional in the distance between the own preferred policy and
the jointly chosen policy.4 In period 0, i.e. when the decision mechanism
is implemented, expected utility of a player is given by
E (Ui) = E
¡
¡ (xi ¡ x)
2
¢
= ¡E
¡
x2i + x
2 ¡ 2xix
¢
: (1)
It is easy to show that under (A2) the preferences xi can be normalized
on any interval without loss of generality as long as x is normalized in
the same way.
In the following I will consider additive social welfare functions
(SWF). In the general case the players might have difierent weights in
the SWF. Ex-post welfare is then given as
W =
X
i2N
°iUi =
X
i2N
¡°i (xi ¡ x)
2 ;
X
i2N
°i = 1; °1 ‚ °2 ‚ ::: ‚ °n ‚ 0:
(A3)
Expected welfare in period 0 is
E (W ) =
X
i2N
°iE
¡
¡ (xi;t ¡ xt)
2
¢
= ¡
X
i2N
°iE
¡
x2i + x
2 ¡ 2xix
¢
(2)
4Some results in this paper depend quite crucial on this assumption. I belief that
a function with increasing marginal losses is more realistic than one with constant
marginal losses.
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The normalization of the welfare weights °i and the ordering of the play-
ers is made just for convenience. The most simple and standard case is
the one of an equally weighted SWF, i.e. °i =
1
n
8i. But for committees
as in the European Union it is reasonable to allow for difierent weights in
order to incorporate the difierent size of European countries. The SWF’s
considered in this paper have the feature that only the committee mem-
bers and no constituencies choosing the members are taken into account.
This can be justifled by assuming that members of the committee pursue
solely the homogenous interests of the people that choose them. Another
justiflcation might be that the welfare efiects of the selection mechanisms
are not part of the welfare efiects of the committee decisions. This re-
striction is more natural if one considers the formation of supranational
institutions as the EU than if one considers the welfare efiects of decisions
made in national parliaments.
As a benchmark case, consider flrst the solution for a social planner
whose only constraint is that the decisions are binding for every player.
Maximizing (A3) with respect to x shows that the joint optimal decision
x¤ equals the weighted mean, where the weights are the those of the
SWF. Formally,
x¤ =
X
i2N
°ixi (3)
Expected welfare in period 0 is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The expected welfare of the joint optimal decision is
E (W ) = ¡
1
12
ˆ
1¡
X
i
°2
i
!
Proof. Consider a new normalization of the preferences such that the
expected value of the preferred policy is equal to zero. Formally, x0
i
=
xi¡
1
2
8i. Note that this renormalization does not change the values of
the utility functions. We get
E
¡
x02
i
¢
=
Z 1
2
¡
1
2
x2dx =
1
12
(4)
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E
¡
x0ix
0
j
¢
= E (x0i)E
¡
x0j
¢
= 0 8j 6= i (5)
E
¡
x02
¢
= E
µ‡X
°ix
0
i
·2¶
= E
ˆX
i
°2i x
02
i +
X
i
X
j 6=i
°i°jx
0
ix
0
j
!
=
X
i
°2iE
¡
x02i
¢
=
1
12
X
i
°2i (6)
E (x0ix
0) = E
ˆ
x0i
X
i2N
°ix
0
i
!
= E
ˆ
°ix
02
i +
X
j 6=i
°jx
0
ix
0
j
!
=
°i
12
(7)
From this it follows that
E (W ) = ¡
X
i2N
°iE
¡
x02i + x
02 ¡ 2x0ix
0
¢
E (W ) = ¡
X
i2N
°i
1
12
ˆ
1 +
X
i
°2i ¡ 2°i
!
= ¡
1
12
ˆ
1¡
X
i
°2i
!
However, it is important to note that this solution is not feasible
in the model because we have private information about the preferences
and no enforceable contracts for sidepayment mechanisms. Since prefer-
ences are single-peaked, we can apply the standard result that the only
mechanisms that are strategy-proof (i.e. revealing the true preferences
is a dominant strategy) and respect voter sovereignty (i.e. no alternative
is a-priori excluded) are median voter schemes.5 Since the main focus of
this paper is the e–ciency of decision mechanisms, it is worth to investi-
gate brie°y (non voting) mechanisms that violate voter sovereignty.
The flrst one is the dictator mechanism. With this mechanism one
player chooses the policy regardless of the realized preferences of the
other players. It is obvious, that from the standpoint of e–ciency the
best dictator mechanism is the one where the most important player
(here player 1) decides, i.e. xd = x1. The following lemma describes the
expected welfare of this mechanism.
5See e.g. Barbera et al. (1993) or Ching (1997).
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Lemma 2 The expected welfare of the optimal dictator mechanism is
E (W ) = ¡
1
6
(1¡ °1)
Proof. Consider the same renormalization of preferences as in the proof
of lemma 1. Then
E (W ) = ¡
ˆ
°1 ¢ 0 +
nX
i=2
°i
¡
E
¡
x02i
¢
+ E
¡
x02
1
¢¢!
(8)
= ¡
1
6
(1¡ °1)
Note that in the case of an equally weighted SWF a random dictator
mechanism is one optimal dictator mechanism.
Another simple mechanism is a flxed policy mechanism, i.e. xf = x.
Obviously, the most e–cient flxed policy is x = E (xi) =
1
2
. In this case
the result is
Lemma 3 Expected welfare of the optimal flxed policy is E (W ) = ¡ 1
12
:
Proof.
E
¡
x2i
¢
=
Z
1
0
x2dx =
1
3
(9)
E (W ) = ¡
X
i2N
°iE
µ
x2i +
1
4
¡ 2xi
1
2
¶
= ¡
X
i2N
°i
µ
1
3
+
1
4
¡
1
2
¶
= ¡
1
12
(10)
Since voting is the most common decision mechanism within com-
mittees and sidepayments are excluded by assumption, I do not consider
mechanisms that might violate strategy-proofness or that rely on trans-
fers among the players. Instead I concentrate in the following on the
properties and welfare implications of difierent voting mechanisms.
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3 The Voting Mechanism
The decision mechanism that I consider is voting among the member
with a weighted majority rule. The set of members (players) in the
committee is denoted by N . The voting game within a committee is
described by (d;w). The vector of voting weights (or simple the votes)
w =(w1; w2; :::wn) are chosen at the constitutional stage and remain flxed
over time. The value of d gives the decision (majority) rule, i.e. the
minimum number of votes required for a majority. A voting game is
usually characterized by its coalitional (or characteristic) function, i.e.
by a function v : 2N ! < that assigns to every coalition S µ N a value
as its worth. For a voting game (d;w) this function is given by
v (S) =
8<
:
1 if wS =
P
i2S
wi ‚ d
0 if wS =
P
i2S
wi < d
: (11)
The number of players in a coalition is denoted by s = jSj. A coalition
is called a minimum winning coalition (MWC) if there exist at least one
player whose exit would turn the coalition from a winning into a loosing
coalition. Formally6,
S is a MWC ifi (v (S) = 1) ^ (9i j v (Sni) = 0) : (12)
In addition I make the following two assumptions
v (S) = 1) v (NnS) = 0 (13)
@ i j v (fig) = 1 (14)
The flrst assumption is a natural restriction for committees since it ex-
cludes that two distinct coalitions could implement difierent policies at
the same time. The second one serves only for distinguishing a dictator
mechanism from a voting mechanism.7 The easiest decision rule, that will
6For simplicity I write Sni instead of Sn fig :
7In a simple voting game the condition
v (S) = 1 =) v (T ) = 1 8T ¶ S (15)
always holds. Occasionally any simple game ful¯lling (13) and (15) is called a com-
mittee, see e.g. Peleg (1984).
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play a major rule in the proceeding, is the simple majority rule without
possibility for a tie. In this case the voting game is constant-sum in its
coalitional function, i.e.
(v (S) = 1), (v (NnS) = 0) ; or (wS ‚ d),
¡
wNnS < d
¢
. (16)
The voting mechanism itself is the following multi-stage game.
When the committee meets all players learned their preferences. More-
over there is a status-quo policy xq 2 X which is the policy valid until
the committee makes a flnal decision. There are inflnitely many voting
rounds, indexed by ¿ . Each voting round occurs an inflnitesimally small
cost c to every member8, which can be thought of as disutility from being
in the meeting. At the beginning of each meeting every player announces
simultaneously a policy xai that he wants to be implemented. In each vot-
ing round a randomly chosen member makes a proposal xpi . Then voting
takes place. Every player votes either ’yes’ or ’no’9, formally
ai =
‰
1 if ’yes’
0 if ’no’
If a majority votes ’yes’, i.e.
P
aiwi ‚ d; this policy will be implemented.
If
P
aiwi < d; a new round starts and another randomly chosen player
(possibly the same) makes a proposal. This procedure continues until a
proposal can be implemented.
I flrst consider that d is the simple majority rule, i.e. I assume
(16) to hold. Under this condition it is straightforward to show that
the game has a unique stationary perfect equilibrium. In equilibrium
the preferred policy of the median voter is implemented without any
delay. The unique stationary perfect equilibrium is characterized by the
following proposition:
8Formally, 0 < c < " for any positive number ":
9Abstentions are regarded as 'no' votes.
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Proposition 4 Assume d is the simple majority rule. Then, in the
unique stationary perfect equilibrium every player announces his preferred
policy, every player proposes the preferred policy of the median voter (xm)
, this policy is implemented, and every player votes ’yes’ if and only if a
proposal gives him a utility at least as high as in the equilibrium. Formally
xai = xi; x
p
i = xm 8i; x = xm
ai (x
p) =
‰
1 if jxi ¡ x
pj • jxi ¡ xmj
0 if jxi ¡ x
pj > jxi ¡ xmj
8i:
Proof. see appendix
It should be noted that due to the single-peakedness of the pref-
erences the median voter theorem applies. Moreover, the implemented
policy does not depend on the status-quo policy xq: The introduction of
the announcement stage simply avoids time-consuming pairwise voting.
Evidently, there are possibly many variants of this voting mechanism
that ensure that the preferred policy of the median voter is the chosen
policy.
In principle, the voting procedure described above can be applied
as well to committees using a supra-majority rule. But in this case the
equilibrium depends on the status-quo policy. Moreover, it is possible
that multiple stationary perfect equilibria arise. The appendix contains
an example illustrating this point. The multiplicity results from the
fact that with a supra-majority rule the set of policies that cannot be
beaten (if players are rational) by an alternative is (generically) no longer
single-valued. To avoid this complication, I concentrate in the following
on voting games that fulflll condition (16).
4 Welfare and Vote Allocation
In this section I derive a formula that measures the welfare efiects of
a committee. As mentioned above, I restrict the analysis to the case
that d is the simple majority rule. The welfare measure I use is the
expected value of the SWF in period 0; i.e. when the voting mechanism
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is implemented. It is obvious that ex-post (i.e. after the preferences
become known) the optimal vote allocation is one that makes the player
as the median who is closest to the social optimum, i.e. in our model the
weighted mean. But state-dependent vote allocations are excluded from
the analysis for reasons of reality.
I start this analysis by regarding the expected utility of an individ-
ual player, computing expected welfare afterwards is relatively straight-
forward. We can rewrite (1) as
E (Ui) = ¡E
¡
x2
i
¢
+ E
¡
2xixm ¡ x
2
m
¢
(17)
These values are functions of the distribution of the preferences and the
vote allocation, since these two together determine the distribution of
the (weighted) median.
Consider flrst any ordering of preferences
x(1) < x(2) < ::: < xm < x(m+1) < :::x(n);
where xm is the position of the median voter. The density function of
the median position for this given ordering is [cf e.g. Mood et al. (1974)]
fxm (x) =
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
[F (x)]m¡1 [1¡ F (x)]n¡m f (x)
The density function f (x) and the corresponding cumulative distribution
function are given by (A1). Hence we have
fxm (x) =
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
xm¡1 (1¡ x)n¡m (18)
From this we get the following three expression for the conditional ex-
pected value of xixm:
E (xixm j xi = xm) =
Z 1
0
x2fxm (x) dx
=
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
Z 1
0
x2xm¡1 (1¡ x)n¡m dx (19)
=
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
(m + 1)! (n¡m)!
(n+ 2)!
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E (xixm j xi < xm) =
Z
1
0
Z
x
0
1
x
yxdy fxm (x) dx
=
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
1
2
Z
1
0
x2xm¡1 (1¡ x)n¡m dx (20)
=
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
1
2
(m+ 1)! (n¡m)!
(n+ 2)!
E (xixm j xi > xm) =
Z
1
0
Z
1
x
1
1¡ x
xydy fxm (x) dx
=
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
1
2
Z
1
0
¡
x + x2
¢
xm¡1 (1¡ x)n¡m dx (21)
=
n!
(m¡ 1)! (n¡m)!
1
2
•
(m + 1)! (n¡m)!
(n+ 2)!
+
m! (n¡m)!
(n+ 1)!
‚
I flrst consider the case that every player has exactly one vote and
that n is odd. In this case the position of the median is always the same,
i.e. m = n+1
2
: Thus equations (19) ; (20) and (21) simplify to
E (xixm j xi = xm) = E
¡
x2
m
¢
=
n+1
2
n+3
2
(n+ 1) (n+ 2)
=
n+ 3
4 (n+ 2)
(22)
E (xixm j xi < xm) =
n+ 3
8 (n+ 2)
(23)
E (xixm j xi > xm) =
1
2
µ
n+ 3
4 (n+ 2)
+
n+1
2
n+ 1
¶
=
n+ 3
8 (n+ 2)
+
1
4
(24)
The expected welfare of the voting mechanism where every player has
one vote is then given by the following proposition
Proposition 5 Expected social welfare of a committee fulfllling A1,A2,A3
and (16) where every player has one vote and n is odd is
E (W ) = ¡
1
3
+
1
4
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
(25)
Proof. Consider flrst expected utility for an individual player (17). We
have
E
¡
x2
i
¢
=
Z
1
0
x2dx =
1
3
: (26)
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For the remaining term we get
E
¡
2xixm ¡ x
2
m
¢
=
8>><
>>:
E (x2
m
) = n+3
4(n+2)
if xi = xm
21
2
n+3
4(n+2)
¡ E (x2
m
) = 0 if xi < xm
21
2
‡
n+3
4(n+2)
+ 1
2
·
¡ E (x2
m
) = 1
2
if xi > xm
(27)
Since every player has the same votes and all orderings are equally likely,
symmetry implies
prob (xi = xm) =
1
n
; prob (xi < xm) = prob (xi > xm) =
n¡ 1
2n
(28)
Hence we get
E (Ui) = ¡
1
3
+
1
n
n+ 3
4 (n+ 2)
+
n¡ 1
4n
= ¡
1
3
+
n+ 3 + (n¡ 1) (n+ 2)
4n (n+ 2)
= ¡
1
3
+
1
4
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
(29)
E (W ) =
X
°iE (Ui) = ¡
1
3
+
1
4
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
Comparing proposition 2 with the two benchmark mechanism, i.e. com-
paring (25) with (9) and (8) leads to the following two corollaries
Corollary 6 The one-player-one-vote rule gives strictly higher welfare
than the optimal flxed policy.
Proof.
¡
1
3
+
1
4
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
> ¡
1
12
()
1
4
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
>
1
4
()
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
> 1
Corollary 7 The one-player-one-vote rule gives strictly higher welfare
than the optimal dictator mechanism if °1 <
3
2
(n+1)2
(n+1)2¡1
¡ 1:
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Proof.
¡
1
3
+
1
4
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
> ¡
1
6
(1¡ °1)
() 1¡ °1 > 2¡
3
2
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
() °1 <
3
2
(n+ 1)2
(n+ 1)2 ¡ 1
¡ 1
Now I turn to the more general case where the players might have
difierent votes. Since there are far more permutations (n!) than possible
coalitions (2n¡1), it is convenient to determine expected utility not over
permutations but over coalitions. To see this point, consider one ordering
where player i is the median voter. Denote10
Sni = fj j xj < xig ; NnS = fk j xk > xig .
From equations (19)¡ (21) we know that for computing the conditional
expected utility the ordering among the players ’left’ of player i as well
of those ’right’ of player i do not matter. Thus there are (s¡ 1)! (n¡ s)!
permutations that have an identical efiect on the expected welfare. More-
over, recall that under (A1) all of the n! permutations are equally likely.
Finally, we have from (11) that xi = xm ) v (S) ¡ v (Sni) = 1: With
these preliminary results in mind, expected welfare of a committee is
given by the following formula
Proposition 8 In a committee fulfllling A1, A2, A3 and (16), expected
social welfare is given by
E (W ) = ¡
1
3
+
X
i2N
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)] (30)
•
(s + 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
°i +
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
(1¡ °s)
‚
where °s =
P
i2S °i
10Note that the events xj = xi and xk = xi have zero probability.
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Proof. 1. We have
E
¡
x2i
¢
=
Z
1
0
x2dx =
1
3
: (31)
2. For the expected value of the squared median decision we have
E
¡
x2m
¢
=
X
i2N
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)]
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
(32)
3. The in°uence of a median on the terms 2E (xixm) is
2
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)]
•
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
1 +
1
2
(s + 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
(s¡ 1)
+
1
2
µ
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
+
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
¶
(n¡ s)
‚
(33)
The flrst term within the last brackets gives the impact on the welfare
of the median himself, the second term the impact on other players in S
and the last term the impact on players outside S:
Combining these three expressions and multiplying them with the
social welfare weights gives
E (W ) = ¡
1
3
+
X
i2N
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)]
•
(s + 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
(¡1 + 2°i + °s ¡ °i + 1¡ °s) (34)
+
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
(1¡ °s)
‚
= ¡
1
3
+
X
i2N
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)] (35)
•
(s + 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
°i +
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
(1¡ °s)
‚
Using an indicator function for the membership of a player in a
coalition, i.e.
Ii;S =
‰
1 if i 2 S
0 if i =2 S
15
and rearranging terms gives the following expression for the expected
utility of an individual player:
E (Ui) = ¡
1
3
+
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)]
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
(36)
+
X
j 6=i
X
SÄ j
[v (S)¡ v (Snj)] (1¡ Ii;S)
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
Formula (36) illustrates clearly why power indices (PI) are insu–-
cient to measure the welfare efiects of these kind of models. In any sto-
chastic game where all permutations of ordered preferences are equally
likely, the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of a voting game gives the proba-
bility that a player can enforce his preferred policy in the voting game.11
Formally, the Shapley-Shubik value `i is given by
`i =
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)]
(s¡ 1)! (n¡ s)!
n!
(37)
The comparison between (36) and (37) shows, that the Shapley-Shubik
value does not give the right efiect of the decision of the median on himself
and neglects the efiects on the other players. The fact that other people
receive nothing from the median decision, illustrates that the Shapley-
Shubik index might be appropriate for voting over private goods, but not
for voting over public goods like policies.12
5 Optimal Voting Games
In this section the conditions for a welfare optimal voting game are de-
rived. Since the attention is restricted to the simple majority rule, we
have to maximize E (W ) with respect to the votes. Formally, optimal
11See e.g. Owen (1995).
12For an early critic why standard PI are insu±cient for decisions on public-goods
see Barry (1980).
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voting games are here deflned as the solution of the following maximiza-
tion problem
max
(d;w)
E (W ) = ¡
1
3
+
X
i2N
X
SÄi
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)] (38)
•
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
°i +
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
(1¡ °s)
‚
s:t: (v (S) = 1) , (v (NnS) = 0)
I consider flrst the case in which each member of the committee has equal
weight in the SWF. Starting with the case that n is odd, the following
proposition shows that the very simple one-player-one-vote rule is welfare
maximizing.
Proposition 9 The vote allocation wi = 1 8i and d =
n+1
2
maximizes
the expected welfare in a committee fulfllling A1,A2,A3 and (16) if n is
odd and °i =
1
n
8i:
Proof. With °i =
1
n
equation (30) becomes
E (W ) = ¡
1
3
+
X
i2N
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)]
•
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
1
n
+
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
µ
n¡ s
n
¶‚
Hence expected welfare depends only on the size of coalitions. Equiva-
lently, expected welfare in any ordering of the players according to their
preferences is determined by the position of the median. This implies
that, if possible, all coalitions where v (S)¡ v (Sni) = 1, i.e. all MWC,
have the same size in the optimal vote allocation. From the fact that the
Shapley Shubik index sums up to 1 we get immediately that thenX
i2N
X
SÄ i
[v (S)¡ v (Sni)] =
n!
(s¡ 1)! (n¡ s)!
Hence the problem (38) reduces to
max
s
n!
(s¡ 1)! (n¡ s)!
•
(s+ 1)! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 2)!
1
n
+
s! (n¡ s)!
(n+ 1)!
µ
n¡ s
n
¶‚
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or even simpler
max
s
s (s+ 1) + s (n¡ s) (n+ 2) (39)
The FOC of this problem13 is
s¤ =
n+ 1
2
The voting game
¡
n+1
2
;1
¢
obviously guarantees that all MWC have ex-
actly n+1
2
members.
The proof leads immediately to a complete characterization of all
optimal vote allocations for the case in which n is odd.
Corollary 10 All optimal voting games in a committee in which n is
odd and °i =
1
n
8i and that fulfllls A1, A2, A3 and (16) have the same
coalitional function as v
£
n+1
2
; 1
⁄
.
The proof of proposition 4 leads as well to the characterization of
all optimal voting games for the case that n is even. Since in this case
the expression (39) is minimized at s = n
2
and s = n
2
+ 1; optimal voting
games are characterized by the following corollary
Corollary 11 In all optimal voting games in a committee fulfllling A1,
A2, A3 and (16) with n even and °i =
1
n
all MWC are of size s = n
2
or
s = n
2
+ 1:
The case of difierent weights in the SWF is analytically much more
di–cult to solve. The problem is that expected social welfare is neither
continuous nor monotonic in the voting weights. For small n a complete
characterization can be given, but for larger n the solution has to be
found numerically. For simplicity I focus in the following on the case in
which n is odd.
First insights can be found by checking the optimality of the bench-
mark cases. We know from corollary 1 that the flxed policy mechanism is
never optimal since the one-player-one vote rule leads to higher welfare.
Comparing (30) with (8) leads to the following corollary.
13Since the function is concave in s; the second order condition is ful¯lled as well.
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Corollary 12 A su–cient condition for a dictator mechanism to be sub-
optimal is °1 <
n
n+2
:
Proof. See appendix.
Further interesting results can be found by a complete characteriza-
tion of all possible difierent values of (30) for a small number of players.
The appendix gives a complete treatment for the case that n = 5 and
d is the simple majority rule. Consider e.g. the following social welfare
weights: °e=(0:48; 0:26; 0:26; 0; 0) ; i.e. player 4 and 5 do not count for
social welfare. In this case the vote allocation w5 = (3; 2; 2; 1; 1) leads
to a value of E (W ) = ¡0:065 which is higher than for any possible vote
allocation that assign no votes to players 4 and 5.14 To see this point,
assume that player 2 and 3 want a policy close to zero and player 1 wants
a policy close to 1. If player 4 and 5 prefer a policy around 1
2
; the chosen
policy with the vote allocation w5 is much closer to the joint optimal
policy than the equilibrium policy in voting games where w4 = w5 = 0.
Obviously, there are realizations where the inclusion of player 4 and 5 in
the committee is actually welfare reducing. This happens e.g. if
x4 = x5 = 0; x2 =
1
4
; x1 =
1
2
; x2 =
3
4
:
If player 4 and 5 have no votes the equilibrium policy would be close to the
joint optimum. The vote allocation w5; however, leads to the suboptimal
policy x = 1
4
: But for the social welfare weights °e the welfare reducing
efiects of the vote allocation w5 are ex-ante smaller than the welfare
improving efiects. The conclusion from this example is that there exist
committees where it is welfare improving to include players that have no
weights in the SWF since they might help to moderate policies.
For large committees it becomes tedious to compute all possible val-
ues of E (W ) : Thus the optimal solution can be better found by applying
an appropriate search algorithm. As mentioned above, the problem is
that E (W ) is neither continuous nor monotonic in the voting weights or
14The game v (51; 48;26; 26) = v (2; 1; 1; 1) gives E (W ) = ¡0:0667 and the dictator
mechanism gives E (W ) = ¡0:0866:
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the decision rule. In order to avoid that one flnds only local maxima of
E (W ) ; the use of multistage algorithms that use many starting points
should deliver the solution of the welfare maximization problem. As an
illustration, regard the 11-player committee with social welfare weights
given as
° = (0:312; 0:213; 0:186; 0:11; 0:056; 0:037; 0:031; 0:025; 0:018; 0:011; 0:002)
This example characterizes the ECB-Council of the future European
Monetary Union consisting of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Nether-
lands, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg.
The weights in the SWF are the importance measures as they are laid
down in the Maastricht treaty.15 The optimal vote allocation that I could
flnd is
w = (414; 318; 291; 203; 127; 122; 115; 115; 99; 87; 68)
The relative votes in this allocation are
wP
wi
= (0:211; 0:162; 0:149; 0:104; 0:065; 0:062; 0:059; 0:059; 0:051;
0:044; 0:035)
The optimal vote allocation lies somehow in between the one-player-
one-vote rule and the rule w = °:16 Hence one might conclude from
this example that in the solution to the welfare maximization problem
difierences in the welfare weights should be only partially taken into
account. Moreover, it is apparent that Luxembourg has a remarkable
in°uence in the voting game even though its in°uence on welfare is quasi
negligible. This indicates that there are potential beneflts of including
players with weights in the SWF of zero (or almost zero) not only in
small but as well in larger committees.
15See Brueckner (1997) for a model of voting and bargaining over monetary policy
in the ECB with public information of preferences.
16If one considers the Shapley-Shubik values of this game, we get
Á = (0:235;0:164; 0:154;0:101;0:056; 0:056; 0:051; 0:051; 0:048; 0:041; 0:041)
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6 Conclusion
In this paper it was shown that the expected welfare of a committee
where players with diverging interests decide on jointly binding poli-
cies can be expressed in a simple formula. It was shown that with an
equally weighted social welfare function the simple one-player-one-vote
rule is optimal. Hence the question of optimal mechanism design has
an easy solution in this case. For unequal welfare weights the problem
becomes more complicated but a numerical solution can always be pro-
vided. Moreover, it was shown that it is optimal in some cases to include
players in a committee whose weight in the SWF is negligible or even
zero. The analysis in this paper should not only lead to new insights for
an understanding of existing committees but may help as well for the
design of new committees.
As in many voting models, the assumption of single-peaked prefer-
ences is probably the most restrictive. Many committees, most notably
parliaments and the EU Council, decide about many policies that might
not correctly characterized by (multidimensional) single-peakness of pref-
erences. By bundling many decisions, these committees could eventually
moderate con°icts more efiectively. But due to the problems arising from
bargaining costs and private information, jointly optimal policies are still
likely to be not feasible. Hence it remains an interesting theoretical and
empirical question whether a system of many (small) independent com-
mittees deciding each on single issues or a system of one central commit-
tee leads to socially more preferable policies.
21
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
This proof is basically a combination of the proof of the median
voter theorem and the proof of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
in n-player bargaining games with random proposers (see e.g. Winter
(1992) for the latter).
Proof. First I deflne the median voter. Denote the set of players with
preferences ’left’ resp. ’right’ of player i with
Li = fj j xj • xi; j 6= ig ; Ri = fj j xj ‚ xi; j 6= ig
The median m is the player i who fulfllls the conditionˆX
j2Li
wj < d
!
^
ˆX
j2Ri
wj < d
!
(40)
Then, note that in any stationary equilibrium the flnal decision is made
in the flrst voting round, since delay is costly. Next I show that the only
policy that can be implemented in equilibrium is xm:
8i 2 fLm [mg : xm ” x^ if xm < x^
(wLm + wm > d) ) (x • xm) (41)
8i 2 fRm [mg : xm ” x^ if xm > x^
(wRm + wm > d) ) (x ‚ xm) (42)
([41] ^ [42]) ) x = xm (43)
Since xm is the unique equilibrium policy, proposing this policy is a
strictly dominating strategy for every player, i.e. xpi = xm 8i:
For determining the voting strategies ai (x
p) ; I consider flrst the
strategies in equilibrium, i.e. ai (xm) : It is easy to see that ai (xm) = 1
is a weakly dominating strategy for all players. IfˆX
j 6=i
aj (xm)wj < d
!
^
ˆX
j 6=i
aj (xm)wj + wi ‚ d
!
; (44)
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ai (xm) = 1 leads to a strictly higher payofi for player i. For all strategies
of the other players that do not fulflll (44), both (pure) voting strategies
result in the same pay-ofis. Hence in any trembling-hand perfect equilib-
rium we must have ai (xm) = 1 8i: To complete the characterization of
the voting stage, it remains to determine the out of equilibrium voting
strategies ai (x
p). Since every player accepts votes ’yes for xp = xm, sub-
game perfectness requires that he votes ’yes’ for all proposals that give
him at least the same utility. Conversely, he votes ’no’ when xp gives
him a lower pay-ofi than the equilibrium policy.
Finally, it remains to proof that announcing the preferred policy is
the unique perfect equilibrium in the announcement stage. It is straight-
forward to show that xai = xi is a weakly dominating strategy. In case i
is the median voter, xam = xm is the unique best response given the equi-
librium strategies in the following subgames. If i is not the median voter,
there are two possible cases. Suppose (without loss of generality), that
xi < xm: Any x
a
i < xm does not afiect the following stages in the game.
Any xai > xm moves the (announced) median position to the right and
leads to a strictly lower pay-ofi for player i. Since the announcements
are made simultaneously, xai = xi is the only trembling hand perfect
equilibrium strategy in the flrst stage.
Example for multiplicity with supra-majority rule
Consider a committee with three players that decide by unanimity,
i.e. N = 3; w = (1; 1; 1); d = 3: For the status-quo policy assume
xq = 0. Take the realizations
x1 =
1
3
; x2 =
1
2
; x3 =
3
4
:
Any policy x 2
£
1
3
; 2
3
⁄
can be supported in a stationary perfect equilib-
rium. First note that x > 2
3
cannot be an equilibrium since player 1
would be worse ofi than in the status-quo. Secondly, x < 1
3
cannot be an
equilibrium either since all players prefer a policy x = 1
3
: If player 1 uses
in the second stage the stationary strategy
a1 (x
p) =
‰
1 if
flfl1
3
¡ xp
flfl • 0
0 if
flfl1
3
¡ xp
flfl > 0
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proposing and accepting the policy xp = 1
3
is the best response of player
2 and 3. Hence x = 1
3
is an equilibrium policy. On the other hand, if
player 3 uses in the second stage the stationary strategy
a3 (x
p) =
‰
1 if
flfl3
4
¡ xp
flfl • 1
12
0 if
flfl3
4
¡ xp
flfl > 1
12
all players propose and accept the equilibrium policy x = 2
3
: With the
same kind argument it can be shown that all policies x 2
£
1
3
; 2
3
⁄
can be
equilibrium policies.
Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. Take the difierence between (8) and (30) for a voting game where
player 1 forms a winning coalition with any other single player, formally
v (f1; ig) = 1 8i 6= 1: The difierence can be written as
dv = (1¡ °1)
•
3! (n¡ 2)!
(n+ 2)!
+
(n¡ 2) 2! (n¡ 2)!
(n+ 1)!
+
n!1!
(n+ 2)!
‚
+°1
(n¡ 1) 1! (n¡ 1)!
(n+ 1)!
¡ °1
•
2! (n¡ 1)!
(n+ 2)!
+
(n+ 1)!0!
(n+ 2)!
‚
¡ (1¡ °1)
1! (n¡ 1)!
(n+ 1)!
Simpliflcation shows that
dv > 0
, 2n2 ¡ 2n > °1
¡
2n2 + 2n¡ 4
¢
, °1 <
n
n+ 2
Welfare in a 5-player committee
For the case that n = 5 and d is the simple majority without
possibility of a tie, there are only 6 difierent voting games when the
votes are (weakly) ordered according to the social welfare weights °i:
They can be described by the following six vote vectors
w1 = (3; 3; 3; 0; 0) ;w2 = (3; 1; 1; 1; 1) ;w3 = (2; 2; 1; 1; 1)
w4 = (3; 2; 2; 2; 0) ;w5 = (3; 2; 2; 1; 1) ;w6 = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1) :
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These vote allocations lead to the following values for period 0 welfare.
W 1
0
= ¡
1
3
+
1
420
(112°1 + 112°2 + 112°3 + 84°4 + 84°5)
W 2
0
= ¡
1
3
+
1
420
(132°1 + 90°2 + 90°3 + 90°4 + 90°5)
W 3
0
= ¡
1
3
+
1
420
(114°1 + 114°2 + 100°3 + 100°4 + 100°5)
W 4
0
= ¡
1
3
+
1
420
(126°1 + 98°2 + 98°3 + 98°4 + 84°5)
W 5
0
= ¡
1
3
+
1
420
(120°1 + 106°2 + 106°3 + 92°4 + 92°5)
W 6
0
= ¡
1
3
+
1
420
(108°1 + 108°2 + 108°3 + 108°4 + 108°5)
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